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Neville: Neville: New Value Exception to the Chapter 11

The New Value Exception to the
Chapter 11 Absolute Priority Rule
Bonner Mall Partnershipv. US. Bancorp Mortgage Co.

(In re Bonner Mall Partnership)'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The absolute priority rule, as codified in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code,
provides that in certain circumstancesjunior claimants of a company involved
in a Chapter 11 reorganization may not receive or retain any property under
the reorganization plan.2 The new value exception to the Chapter 11 absolute
priority rule allows a debtor's owner to retain an interest in a business or
property under certain circumstances, even if all senior claimants are not paid
in full.' The exception, first recognized by the United States Supreme Court
in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber ProductsCo.,4 was originally used to alleviate
inflexibility in the application of the absolute priority rule.5 Today, the
exception is important because it allows the management of a business to
remain with the original owners, who may be in the best position to
reestablish a profitable business.6 However, there is currently a question as
to whether the new value exception survived the enactment of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code.' In Bonner Mall Partnershipv. U.S. BancorpMortgage

1. 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Bonner 1], cert. granted, 114 S. Ct.
681, motion to vacate denied, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994). The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide "whether appellate courts in the federal system
shouldvacate civiljudgments of subordinate courts incasesthat are settled after appeal
is filed or certiorari sought." Bonner, 115 S. Ct. at 388-89.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988). Seeinfranotes42-43 andaccompanying
text.

3. Linda J. Rusch, New Value Exception to the Absolute PriorityRulein Chapter
11 Reorganizations,What Should theRule Be?, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1311, 1313 (1992).
4. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).

5. John T. Bailey, The "New Value Exception" in Single-AssetReorganizations:
Commentaryon the Bjolmes Auction Procedureand its Relationship to Chapter11, 98
COM. L.J 50, 50 (1993).
6. BonnerI,2 F.3d at 916. The court points out that several studies demonstrate
that past reorganizations have been more successful when former management was

allowed to continue running the business. Id.
7. Rusch, supranote 3, at 1314.
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Co. (In re Bonner Mall Partnership),' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered this issue and determined that the exception still survives. 9

I1. FACTS AND HOLDING
Bonner Mall was completed in 1985 and later sold to Bonner Mall
Partnership ("Bonner") in October 1986.0 The mall served as security for
a $6.3 million loan which was purchased by U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co.
("Bancorp")." When the cash flow from the mall began to fall short of
Bonner's expectations and the real estate tax on the mall went unpaid,
Bancorp instituted a nonjudicial foreclosure action. 2 A trustee's sale was set
for March 14, 1991, but the sale never occurred because of the automatic stay
which took effect when Bonner filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition the day
before the sale. 3
In response to Bonner's bankruptcy petition, Bancorp moved for relief
from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). 4 The bankruptcy court
denied Bancorp's motion and allowed Bonner to propose a reorganization
plan. 5 When Bonner proposed its plan to the bankruptcy court, Bancorp
renewed its motion for relief from the stay. 6 In support of its motion,
Bancorp argued that Bonner's plan was not confirmable as a matter of law

8. 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), motion to vacate denied, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994).
9. Id. at 918.

10. Id. at 901.
11. Id.

12. Id. at 902.
13. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 362 provides for an automatic stay of any action against the
debtor or its property upon the filing of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. See 11
U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
14. Bonnerl, 2 F.3d at 902. A party in interest can request that the bankruptcy
court grant relief from the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988). Section
362(d)(1) provides for relief upon a showing of cause. Id. § 362(d)(1). In addition,
under § 362(d)(2), the court will grant relief from a stay of an act against property
if the debtor has no equity in the property and the property is not necessary to an
effective reorganization. Id. § 362(d)(2).
15. Bonnerl, 2 F.3d at 902. The bankruptcy court concluded that Bancorp was
not entitled to relief under § 362(d)(2) because the Bonner Mall property was
necessary for an effective reorganization. In re Bonner Mall Partnership, No. 9100801-11, 1991 WL330784,at*l (Bankr. D. Idaho Dec. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Bonner
1M, rev'd, 142 B.R. 911 (D. Idaho 1992), aff'd, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), motion to
vacate denied, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994). Although the motion was denied, the court
authorized Bancorp "to renew its motions to test the confnability of the debtor's
proposed chapter 11 plan." Id.

16. Bonner, 2 F.3d at 902.
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because it violated the absolute priority rule 7 by allowing Bonner to retain
an interest in the property without requiring payment in full of Bancorp's
unsecured claim."8 Bonner argued that its plan satisfied the absolute priority
rule through the new value exception, whereby new capital which is
reasonably equivalent to the value of the retained interest is contributed to the
plan by the debtor. 9 Bancorp argued that the new value exception did not
survive the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and was, therefore, not
available to Bonner.2" The bankruptcy court granted Bancorp's motion.2 1
The court found that the new value exception did not survive the enactment
of the Bankruptcy Code.22
Bonner appealed to the United States District Court for Idaho.23 The
sole issue on appeal was "whether the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code
revoked the new value exception to the absolute priority rule recognized under
the Bankruptcy Act. 24 The district court held that the new value exception
did survive and reversed the bankruptcy court's order.'
Subsequently,
2
Bancorp appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 1
As with the appeal before the district court, the sole issue before the
Ninth Circuit was whether the new value exception survived the enactment of
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. The court held that the new value exception
2
survives and may be used by debtors who are able to meet its requirements. 1

17. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
18. Bonnerl, 1991 WL 330784, at *2.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Bonner, 2 F.3d at 902.
22. Id.

23. Id.
24. Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall
Partnership), 142 B.R. 911, 913 (D. Idaho 1992) [hereinafter Bonnerlll], aff'd, 2 F.3d

899 (9th Cir. 1993), motion to vacate denied, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994).
25. Id.
at 917.
26. Bonnerl, 2 F.3d at 903.
27. Id.
28. Id.
at 918.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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II1. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Significance of the New Value Exception in a
Chapter11 Reorganization Scheme
Chapter 11 allows a business" to reorganize in an attempt to provide
more value from continued operation of a reorganized entity than would result
from liquidation of the business.3 A major issue to be resolved in a Chapter
11 proceeding is the allocation of this increased value and control of the
business among the creditors and equity holders of the business.31 In many
cases, the creditors will approve a reorganization plan which allows the
business owners to retain an interest in the business on the theory that the
reorganized business has a greater chance of success in the original owners'
hands than the creditors'. 32 If the creditor classes approve such a plan,
confirmation will be governed by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a).33 However, in some
29. Although Chapter I I was designed for business reorganizations, Rusch, supra
note 3, at 1316 n.10, individuals have access to reorganization under Chapter 11. Id.
See also Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991). Due to the business orientation of
the new value exception, issues surrounding the exception will arise only in the
business context.
30. Rusch, supranote3, at 1316.
31. Rusch, supranote3, at 1316.
32. Paul S. Aronzon et al., The New Value Exception: Possibly Alive But
ApparentlyNot Well, 804 PLI/Corp 395, 399 (1993). See also Bonnerl, 2 F.3d at 916
(noting that several studies "demonstrate that reorganizations have been more
successful when former management was allowed to use its expertise in running the
business.").
33. A reorganization plan will be confirmed under § 1129(a) if the 13
requirements of the section are satisfied. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1-13) (1988). One of
the requirements is: "With respect to each class of claims or interests-(A) such class

has accepted the plan; or (B)such class is not impaired under the plan." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(8) (1988). Thus, if a class does not approve the plan and is impaired by it,
the plan cannot be confirmed under § 1129(a).
Whether a class is impaired under a plan is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 1124.
Section 1124 sets forth three circumstances in which a creditor class is not impaired.
First, the plan may propose not to alter the legal, equitable, or contractual
rights to which the claim or interest entitled its holder. Second, a claim or
interest is unimpaired by curing the effect of a default and reinstating the
original terms of an obligationwhenimaturitywas brought on or accelerated
Third, a claim or interest is unimpaired if the plan
by the default ....
provides for their payment in cash.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5906. In many cases, claims are impaired because they are not paid in full.
Rusch, supra note 3, at 1318-19. For a detailed discussion of impairment, see 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/5
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cases, one or more classes of creditors will object to a plan which allows the
business owners to retain an interest without paying the full value of the
creditors' claims. 4 When one or more creditor classes object,35 section
1129(a) does not apply36 and confirmation of the plan is governed by 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b).
Section 1129(b) sets forth the circumstances in which a reorganization
plan may be confirmed over the objection of a creditor class." Among the
prerequisites to confirmation contained in section 1129(b) is the requirement
that the plan be "fair and equitable."3 The fair and equitable requirement
is applied differently to secured and unsecured classes of creditors. 9
Application of the requirement to unsecured classes of creditors is provided
by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B). 4 As applied to unsecured creditors, "fair and

LAWRENCE P. KING, CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCy 1124.03 (15th ed. 1991) and Joseph
M. Gaynor, Jr., Comment, Impairment,3 BANKR. DEv. J. 579, 581 (1986).
34. Aronzon et al., supra note 32, at 399.
35. See supra note 33.
36. However, with the exception of § 1129(a)(8), the requirements of § 1129(a)
are incorporated into § 1129(b). 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988).
37. Confirmation of a reorganization plan in this manner is commonly known as
a "cramdown" because "the plan is crammed down the throats ofthe objecting class(es)
of creditors." Bonner, 2 F.3d at 906. For a discussion of cramdowns, see Kenneth
N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About CramDown Underthe New Bankruptcy
Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988). The requirements under § 1129(b) are:
Notwithstanding section 510(a) of this title, if all of the applicable
requirements of subsection (a) of this section other than paragraph (8) are
met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the proponent of the
plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the requirements of such
paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and
equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired
under, and has not accepted, the plan.
Id. The impairment requirement is the same as in § 1129(a)(8). For a discussion of
the impairment requirement, see supranote 33.
39. The fair and equitable requirement, as applied to secured creditors, is set forth
in § 1129(b)(2)(A). This application of the fair and equitable requirement does not
include the absolute priority rule and is therefore irrelevant to a discussion of the new
value exception. However, it is important to note that compliance with the fair and
equitable requirement as applied to secured creditors, as well as other requirements,
is vital to the success of a cramdown confinmation. For a discussion of these other
requirements, see Rusch, supra note 3, at 1316-20.
40. This section provides:
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claimsPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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equitable" includes41 the requirement that the plan provides that each claim
holder will receive property equal in value to the amount of the claim.42 If
the plan does not provide this, the fair and equitable requirement can only be
met if holders of a junior claim or interest will not receive or retain any
property under the plan. 3 This rule is commonly known as the absolute
priority rule and has been applied in Chapter 11 cases since it was first
introduced by the United States Supreme Court in Louisville Trust Co. v.
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway.4

Because a plan must be

deemed fair and equitable to be confirmed, a plan which does not propose to
give full value for unsecured claims must observe, with one possible
exception,45 the absolute priority rule. The existence of this possible
exception-the new value exception-is the sole issue in Bonner I."
When recognized, the new value exception allows an equity holder to
escape the absolute priority rule by allowing receipt or retention of "an interest

(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or
retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date
of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such
class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior
claim or interest any property.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1988).
41. Section 1129(b)(2) states that the concept of fair and equitable "includesthe
following requirements ...." (emphasis added). This wording suggests that the
requirements set forth in the section are not necessarily the only requirements with
which a plan must comply to be fair and equitable. See infra notes 103-04 and
accompanying text.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) (1988).

43. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
44. 174 U.S. 674 (1899). The principle of complete subordination of equity
holders set forth by the Court is the same as is now codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and referred to as the absolute priority rule. See Aronzon et al.,
supranote 32, at 405-07. For discussion of the development of the absolute priority
rule, see Edward S.Adams, Toward aNew Conceptualizationof the Absolute Priority
Rule and its New Value Exception, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1445, 1450-57; David M.
Powlen & Arnold H. Wuhrman, The New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority
Rule: Is Ahlers the Beginning of the End?, 93 CoM. L.J. 303, 304-05 (1988); J.
Ronald Trost et al., Survey of the New Value Exception to the Absolute PriorityRule,
C836 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 301, 318 (1993).
45. From its debut in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106
(1939), to the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, recognition of the new value
exceptionwas universal. Aronzon et al., supranote 32, at 404. Since the new Code
was enacted, this is no longer true. For a discussion of the history and development
of the exception, see infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
46. BonnerI,2 F.3d at 903.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/5
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in the reorganized debtor in exchange for new capital contributions over the
objections of a class of creditors."47 In order to qualify for the exception, the
contribution of new value must meet four general requirements. The new
value must be: (1) necessary to the reorganization; (2) fresh; (3) of
reasonably equivalent value to the interest received or retained; and (4) of
money or money's worth."

B. Development of the New Value Exception
The new value exception was originally formulated to alleviate problems
resulting from the strict application of the absolute priority rule.49 The
United States Supreme Court first expressed the concept which is now known
as the new value exception in Kansas City TerminalRailway v. Central Union
Trust Co." The Court stated:
[Tic the extent of their debts creditors are entitled to priority over
stockholders against all the property of an insolvent corporation. But it does
not follow that in every reorganization the securities offered to general
creditors must be superior in rank or grade to any which stockholders may
obtain. It is not impossible to accord to the creditor his superior rights in
other ways. Generally, additional funds will be essential to the success of
the undertaking, and it may be impossible to obtain them unless
stockholders are permitted
to contribute and retain an interest sufficiently
51
valuable to move them.
The Supreme Court, when faced with the issue of whether the new value
exception had been codified in the former Bankruptcy Act,52 later officially
recognized the exception in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.5 In
Los Angeles Lumber Products, the shareholders of the bankrupt company

47. Id. at 901.
48. Aronzon et al., supra note 32, at 400. For a detailed discussion of these
requirements, see Adams, supra note 44, at 1470-80; Trost et al., supra note 44, at
344.
49. Several commentators have cited the rigid application of the absolute priority
rule as the motivating force behind the new value exception. See, e.g., Bailey, supra
note 5, at 50; Trost et al., supranote 44, at 319.
50. 271 U.S. 445 (1926). See Aronzon et al., supra note 32, at 401-02.
51. Aronzon et al., supranote 32, at 402 (quoting Kansas City TerminalRy., 271
U.S. at 455).
52. BonnerH1, 142 B.R. at 914.
53. 308 U.S. 106 (1939). The fair and equitable requirement (now codified at
§ 1129(b)) was incorporated, at the time of Los Angeles Lumber Products,into the
former Bankruptcy Act at § 77(a). Bonner II, 142 B.R. at 914.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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proposed a plan whereby they would retain an ownership interest and
management responsibility in the reorganized business. 4 The plan, however,
did not provide for payment of full value of the creditor's claims." In
addition, the shareholders did not propose to contribute new money to the
business. Instead, they argued that their experience in running the business,
the value of continuity of management, and the shareholders' financial
standing and community influence should be sufficient to allow retention of
ownership and management control.56
The Supreme Court rejected the shareholders' argument that experience
and continuity of management justify retention of an ownership interest."
The Court found that such contributions were too difficult to value and should
not be used as an exception to the absolute priority rule.58 The Court held,
however, that an exception should be made for new infusions of money or its
equivalent where the infusion is reasonably equivalent to the retained interest
and is necessary to the success of the reorganized business.59 In so holding,
the Court set the framework for the new value exception.
The Court's formulation of the new value exception in Los Angeles
Lumber Products is virtually identical to the exception as it exists today.60
Numerous decisions prior to the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code
expressed the new value exception and its requirements in substantially the
same form as was set forth in Los Angeles Lumber Products.61 Similarly,
post-1978 Code cases which have recognized the exception have continued to
apply it as originally formulated by the Supreme Court.62 Although there is

54. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. at 111-12.
55. Id. at 109.
56. Id. at 112-13.
57. Id. at 122.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 121-22.
60. Aronzon et al., supra note 32, at 402. But see id. at 434 n.1 (noting that
"[s]ome courts add a 'substantiality' requirement, but this seems to essentially be

encompassed in the 'necessity' requirement."); Trost et al., supranote 44, at 344 ("A
significantnumber of courts have also incorporated an additionalthresholdrequirement
that the new value contribution must be substantial in comparison to the debtor's
prepetition claims.").
61. See, e.g., Marine Harbor Properties Inc. v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 317 U.S.
78, 85-86 (1942); Freeman v. Mulcahy, 250 F.2d 463, 475 (1st Cir. 1957); In re
Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 142 F.2d 411, 414 (3d Cir. 1944), cert.granted,Otis &
Co. v. Securities & Exch. Conm'n, 323 U.S. 624 (1945); Highland Towers Co. v.
Bondholders' Protective Comm., 115 F.2d 58, 60 (6th Cir. 1940); In re Alabama,
Tennessee & Northern R.R., 47 F. Supp. 694,697 (S.D. Ala. 1942); ChaseNat'l Bank
v. Wabash Ry., 40 F. Supp. 859, 865 (E.D. Mo. 1941).
62. See, e.g.,In re Tucson Self-Storage, Inc., 166 B.R. 892, 899 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/5
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little question as to the form and requirements of the new value exception, as
discussed below, its very existence is substantially more questionable.
C. Survival of the New Value Exception PastEnactment of

the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: A Lingering Question
Courts throughout the nation are divided over the issue of whether the
new value exception survived enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.6'
Although a majority of courts have held that the exception remains valid,
some commentators have suggested that courts may be moving away from
recognition of the exception.'

The Supreme Court recently was faced with the new value issue in
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers 5 In its opinion, the Court questioned
the continuing viability of the .exception, but flatly refused to decide the
issue.66 The Court avoided the issue by assuming the continued existence of

1994); In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1128-29 (7th Cir. 1992); Kham & Nate's Shoes
No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1362 (7th Cir. 1990); In re U.S. Truck Co.,
800 F.2d 581, 588 (6th Cir. 1986); In re King Resources Co., 651 F.2d 1326, 1339
(10th Cir. 1980); In re One Times Square Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 159 B.R. 695, 707
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Montgomery CourtApartments of Ingham County, Ltd.,
141 B.R. 324,343 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992); In re Sovereign Group 1985-27, Ltd., 142
B.R. 702, 706 (E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Capital Ctr. Equities, 144 B.R. 262, 267-68
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Batten, 141 B.R. 899, 907 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1992); In
re Michelson, 141 B.R. 715, 720 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992); In re F.A.B. Indus., 147
B.R. 763,765 (C.D. Cal. 1992); In re SLC Ltd. V, 137 B.R. 847, 851 (Bankr. D. Utah
1992); In re Tallahassee Assocs., L.P., 132 B.R. 712, 716 (Bankr. W.D.Pa. 1991); In
re 222 Liberty Assocs., 108 B.R. 971, 983 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1990); In re Mortgage Inv.
Co., 111 B.R. 604, 618 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Pullman Constr. Indus. Inc.,
107 B.R. 909, 947 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Yasparro, 100 B.R. 91, 96 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1989); In re V. Savino Oil & Heating Co., 99 B.R. 518, 526 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1988); In re 47th and Belleview Partners, 95 B.R. 117. 119 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988);
In re Henke, 90 B.R. 451, 456 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988); In re Jartran, Inc., 44 B.R.
331, 366 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984); In re The Duplan Corp., 9 B.R. 921, 925 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
63. Bonnerl, 2 F.3d at 907.
64. See, e.g., Aronzon et al., supranote 32, at 409, 411 (noting that a majority
of courts recognize the exception, but a strong dissent seems to be emerging); But see
Adams, supra note 44, at 1466 ("The current view by most courts and many
commentators seems to be that the judicial rule will survive until Congress explicitly
terminates it.").
65. 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
66. Id. at 203 n.3.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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the exception, but finding that its requirements were not satisfied under the
facts of the case.67
Since the Supreme Court's refusal to rule on the question of the new
value exception's continuing validity in Ahlers, every court of appeals
decision" until Bonner I has similarly declined to answer the question.69
During the same time frame, a majority of district courts and bankruptcy
courts have held that the exception survived enactment of the Code."
67. Bonner, 2 F.3d at 907.
68. The question was addressed in the Fifth Circuit decision in Phoenix Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone II Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint Venture), 948
F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1991), modified, 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
72 (1992). However, the decision was modified to leave the new value exception
question open by removing the portion of the decision which held that the exception
had not survived enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Id.
69. Trost et al., supra note 44, at 336 & n.93 (citing Unruh v. Rushville State
Bank, 987 F.2d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1993); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Route 37 Business Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154, 162 n.12 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Lumber
Exch. Bldg. Ltd. Partnership, 968 F.2d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Snyder, 967
F.2d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Bryson, 961 F.2d 496, 504-05 (4th Cir. 1992);
In re Greystone, 948 F.2d 134, 142 (5th Cir. 1992); Kham & Nate's Shoes v. First
Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1362 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir.
1989)).
70. Trost et al., supranote 44, at 342 & n.107 (citing In re Green, 98 B.R. 981
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989); In re S.A.B.T.C. Townhouse Ass'n, Inc., 152 B.R. 1005
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); In re Albrechts Ohio Inns, Inc., 152 B.R. 496 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1993); In re ROPT Ltd. Partnership, 152 B.R. 406 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993); In
re WaldengreenAssocs., 150 B.R. 468 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); In re Eitemiller, 149
B.R. 626 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993); In re F.A.B. Industries, 147 B.R. 763 (C.D. Cal.
1992)); In re Route 37 Business Park Assocs., 146 B.R. 640 (D.N.J. 1992), affd, 987
F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Shepcaro, 144 B.R. 3 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992); In re
Sovereign Group, 142 B.R. 702 (R.D. Pa. 1992); In re Capital Ctr. Equities, 144 B.R.
262 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Harman, 141 B.R. 878 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In
re Batten, 141 B.R. 899 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1992); In re Montgomery Court Apartments
of Ingham County, Inc., 141 B.R. 324 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992); In re Creekside
Landing, Ltd., 140 B.R. 713 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992); In re SLC Ltd. V, 137 B.R.
847 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992); In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1991); In re Woodscape, 134 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991); In re Professional
Dev. Corp., 133 B.R. 425 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1991); In re VIP Motor Lodge, Inc.,
133 B.R. 41 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991); In re Tallahassee Assocs. L.P., 132 B.R. 712
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); In re Hendrix, 131 B.R. 751 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re
C.P.M. Constr., 124 B.R. 335 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1991); In re E.I. Parks No. 1 Ltd.
Partnership, 122 B.R. 549 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990); In re Mortgage Inv. Co., 111
B.R. 604 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 108 B.R. 971 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Dowden, 143 B.R. 388 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1989); In re Sherwood
Square Assocs., 107 B.R. 872 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989); In re Ashton, 107 B.R. 670
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/5
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However, only one reported lower court decision since Ahlers has confirmed
a plan relying on the new value exception without being overturned or
vacated. 1
IV. INSTANT DECISION

The Ninth Circuit, in BonnerI, approached the analysis of the new value
question in four different ways. First, the court considered whether the Code
provision that codified the absolute priority rule eliminated the new value
exception by not expressly stating it in the provision. 2 Second, the court
examined whether Congress' failure to include the new value doctrine as part
of the fair and equitable requirement demonstrated an intent to eliminate the
exception. 3 Third, the court considered whether Congress' overhaul of the
reorganization process justifies the conclusion that the new value exception no
longer exists.74 Finally, the court analyzed the structure and underlying
policies of Chapter 11 to determine whether they are consistent with the new
value exception.75 Under each line of analysis the result was the same: the
new value exception survives. 6
A. Codification of the Absolute PriorityRule Does

Not Eliminate the New Value Exception
The first issue which the court addressed is whether the codification of
the absolute priority rule at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) is consistent with

(Bankr. D.N.D. 1989); In re Pullman Constr. Indus., Inc., 107 B.R. 909 (Bankr. N.D.
m. 1989); In reAztec Co., 107 B.R. 585 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Snyder, 105
B.R. 898 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989), affid, 967 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Lettick
Typografic, Inc., 103 B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); In re Johnson, 101 B.R. 307
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re Yasparro, 100 B.R. 91 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re
Snyder, 99 B.R 885 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989); In re Kramer, 96 B.R. 972 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1989); In re 47th and Belleview Partners, 95 B.R. 117 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988);
In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l., Inc., 91 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Henke,
90 B.R. 451 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988); In re 8th Street Village Ltd. Partnership, 88 B.R.
853 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.), aftd, 94 B.R. 993 (N.D. Ill. 1988); In re Future Energy Corp.,
83 B.R. 470 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
71. Trost et al., supra note 44, at 343-44.
72. Bonner, 2 F.3d at 907.
73. Id. at 907-908.
74. Id. at 913-14.
75. Id. at 908.
76. Id. at 907.
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the new value exception. 7 Bancorp argued that Bonner's reorganization plan
violated the provision because it allowed an old equity owner to retain an
ownership interest without providing for full payment of Bancorp's unsecured
claim. 8 Bonner argued that a new contribution of capital from a source
outside the bankruptcy estate is an independent act which does not violate the
absolute priority rule. 9 The parties also took opposite sides on the issue of
whether the plain meaning of the statute allows confirmation of a plan which
is based on the new value exception.80
The court began its analysis by looking to the plain meaning of the
When reduced to plain English, section
statutory language."
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) bars "old equity from receiving any property via a
reorganization plan 'on account of its prior ownership interest."' The court
found that the phrase "on account of' was of vital importance to the
interpretation of this statute in the new value context.83 The court reasoned
that a plan which meets the requirements' of the new value exception does
not allow old equity to receive property on account of the prior ownership
interest because the capital contribution is new and is unrelated to the prior
ownership of the business."5 Instead, the old equity receives property on
account of the new capital contribution in that situation.
The court reasoned further that if Congress had intended to prevent old
equity from ever receiving property when a senior claim is not to be paid in
full, it could have simply omitted the "on account of' language from the
code. 6 However, Congress did not omit the language and therefore must
have contemplated situations in which old equity would receive property in a
manner other than "on account of' its prior ownership.'
Finally, the court extended this reasoning to situations in which the prior
equity holders receive an exclusive right to obtain an ownership interest in

77. Id. at 908.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Pub. Welfare Dept. v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552,
577-58 (1990) ("The interpretation of a statutory provision must begin with the plain
meaning of its language.")).
82. Bonner, 2 F.3d at 908.
83. Id. at 909.
84. See supranote 48 and accompanying text for discussion of the requirements
which must be satisfied in order to qualify for the new value exception.
85. Bonnerl, 2 F.3d at 909-10.
86. Id. at 910.
87. Id.
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exchange for an infusion of new capital." So long as the requirements of
the new value exception are met, the court concluded, this situation would be
no different from receipt of an actual ownership interest and would be allowed
under the new Bankruptcy Code.' The court noted that the requirement that
the proposed transaction be "necessary to the success of the reorganization"
would likely be pivotal in an exclusive option situation. 9°
B. Congress'Failureto List the New Value Exception
Under the Fairand Equitable DoctrineDoes Not
Express an Intent to Eliminate the Exception
The second issue which the Ninth Circuit addressed in Bonner I is
whether Congress' failure to specifically provide for the new value exception
in the provision containing the fair and equitable requirement demonstrates an
intent to eliminate the exception. 9 The court concluded that it does not.'
In reaching its conclusion, the court first looked to several cases which
stand for the proposition that if Congress intends for legislation to overrule a
judicially created concept, it will make its intent clear.' Bancorp argued that
this rule only applies when there is a conflict between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law.94 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, pointing out that
while one Supreme Court case applied a similarly narrow interpretation,
several later cases rejected the narrow view and applied this rule to situations
where there was no conflict with non-bankruptcy law.95
Having accepted this proposition, the court then analyzed and rejected
two more of Bancorp's arguments. First, Bancorp argued that the new value
exception was set forth in dicta only once by the Supreme Court in Los
Angeles Lumber Products and never mentioned again." As a result,
Congress would not have known of the new value exception when it enacted

88. Id. at 910-11.
89. Id. at 911.

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 913.
93. Id. at 912. See Dewsnupv. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,419 (1992) (when Congress

amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not start from scratch); PennsylvaniaPub.Welfare
Dept., 495 U.S. at 562 (the Bankruptcy Code should not be read to abandon past
bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended to do so); Kelly
v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47 (1988); Midlantic Nat'l. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of

Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986).
94. Bonner, 2 F.3d at 912 n.31.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 912.
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the 1978 Bankruptcy CodeY The court rejected this argument, saying that
the new value exception was a very widely established pre-Code practice?
In addition, while drafting the Code, Congress considered a proposal to
broaden the new value exception.' Consequently, the court concluded that
Congress knew of the now value exception when it enacted the Code.1"'
The second argument which the court considered is that Congress
expressed a clear intent to change the judicially established pre-Code
practice.101 Bancorp argued that by not codifying the new value exception,
Congress expressed the requisite intent necessary to change pre-Code
practice."° The court did not find this argument persuasive. In reaching its
conclusion, the court looked to the language in section 1129(b)(2) which
states: "fair and equitable... includes the following requirements.... .""
The court reasoned that Congress, by using the word "includes," meant to set
forth the basic requirements for the fair and equitable test while allowing for
possible additional requirements.1 ' Thus, "[t]here is nothing in the
language of the Code that suggests that courts cannot continue to apply the
requirements of the new value exception in determining whether a plan that
affords old equity a property interest in exchange for a capital contribution is
'fair and equitable'. '0 5
The Ninth Circuit went on to discuss the significance of the legislative
history. It pointed out that "[w]here the text of the Code does not
unambiguously abrogate pre-Code practice, courts should presume that
Congress intended it to continue unless the legislative history dictates a
contrary result." ' 6 In this case, the legislative history did not dictate a
contrary result. 7 In fact, the court suggested that the Code's legislative
history actually supports the continued existence of the new value
exception.0 '

97. Id.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
Bonner I, 2 F.3d at 912.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 913 (citing Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419).
107. Bonner 1,2 F.3d at 913.
108. Id. "[The legislative history] contains statements by sponsors of the Code
that although section 1129(b)(2) lists several specific factors interpreting 'fair and
equitable,' others were omittedto avoid statutory complexity and because courts would
independently find that they were fundamental to 'fair and equitable treatment."' Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/5
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C. Congress' Overhaul of the Reorganization Process does not
Justify the Conclusion that the New Value Exception was Abolished
Bancorp's third major argument was that the fact Congress overhauled
the reorganization process should necessarilylead to a conclusion that the new
value exception was abolished. 9 Bancorp first cited Union Bank v.
Wolas"0 in support of its argument."' In Wolas, the Supreme Court held
that the pre-Code practice at issue"' was eliminated by enactment of the
Code."
The Court relied in part on "the major changes made to the
statutory framework by the enactment of the Code . ,,14 However, the
Court's decision was also based largely on the fact that the plain text of the
Code eliminated the pre-Code practice. 11 As a result, the decision cannot
be read to eliminate pre-Code practice based solely on the fact that Congress
had made major changes to the statutory framework. Based on this reasoning,
the court in Bonner I found that absent plain language in the Code, major
changes in the statutory framework alone are not sufficient to eliminate preCode practice.1 6
Bancorp also argued that because the changes to the reorganization
process in Bonner I were more significant than those at issue in Wolas, the
changes should justify elimination of the new value exception." 7 In
rejecting this argument, the court pointed out that although the changes may
be significant, they are "in harmony with the pro-confirmation principle
underlying the new value exception.'

(citing 124 CONG. RF-c. 32,407 (1978) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards); 124 CoNG.

REC. 34,006 (1978) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini)).
109.
110.
111.
112.

Bonner, 2 F.3d at 913.
502 U.S. 151 (1992).
BonnerI, 2 F.3d at 913.
The pre-Code practice at issue inthat casewas the "current expense" rule-a

judicially created exception to the general rule that a bankruptcy trustee may avoid
certain property transfers made by a debtor within 90 days before bankruptcy. Wolas,

502 U.S.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

at 158.
Bonner, 2 F.3d at 914.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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D. New Value Exception is Consistentwith Underlying
Policies of Chapter 11
Finally, the court in Bonner I evaluated how well the new value
exception fits in with the policies underlying Chapter 11." In doing so, the
court identified two major policies underlying Chapter 11: (1) to permit
successful rehabilitation of debtors; and (2) to maximize the value of the
estate."' The court found that both policies are supported by the new value
exception."
The Ninth Circuit found that the new value exception supports the
successful rehabilitation of debtors by providing the debtor with an additional
This capital is important to the debtor because it can
source of capital.'
be used by the estate in the reorganization, as well as funding the plan and
paying creditors." The exception also supports the goal of maximization
of the estate. Former owners may be in the best position to turn a failing
business around. The court in Bonner I pointed out that "in many situations
the new value exception allows control and management of the company to
remain with the original owners, who arguably can best reestablish a profitable
business. Old owners may have valuable expertise and experience that outside
investors lack."' 24
E. Ninth Circuit Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that there was nothing in
the new Bankruptcy Code, Congress' intent in adopting the Code, nor any
policy underlying Chapter 11 which would suggest that the new value

exception did not survive enactment of the Code." 5

Based on these

conclusions, the court held that the new value exception is still a viable
doctrine in the Ninth Circuit and may be used to meet the fair and equitable
requirement set forth in section 1129(b)(1)." 6

119. Id. at 915-17.
120. Id. at 915.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 916 (citing Snyder v. Farm Credit Bank (In re Snyder), 967 F.2d 1126,
1130 (7th Cir. 1992)). See supra note 30 for a discussion of studies which indicate
that reorganizations may be more successful when former owners participate in
management of the reorganized business.

125. Bonnerl, 2 F.3d at 917-18.
126. Id. at 918. The court in Bonner I did not rule on whether Bonner's plan
could meet the requirements of the exception and thereby gain confmnation. It did,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/5
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V. COMMENT
The opinion in Bonner I raises and answers many of the issues which
come up in the context of the new value exception's continuing validity. Of
particular importance are the issues relating to congressional intent and
policies underlying Chapter 11. Arguments on both sides of these issues
undoubtedly will be raised in any case concerning the exception. Becausethe
opinion rejected many of the arguments against the continuing validity of the
exception, advocates and litigants on both sides of the new value debate will
need to adjust their strategies. Those favoring continuing viability now have
one decision with persuasive authority-with the possibility of more to come.
Those opposed now have seen how a court might respond to some of the
major arguments against continuing validity of the exception. They will now
need to adjust these arguments to overcome the potential responses, if
possible, or develop new theories as to why the new value exception should
not survive."
In addition to its impact on possible future decisions, Bonner I may also
have a significant impact on parties to reorganizations in the Ninth Circuit.
One effect will likely be seen in the negotiation process which takes place
before any of the creditor classes object to the plan. Due to this decision,
creditors will be aware that debtors in the Ninth Circuit may be able to obtain
plan confirmation over their objections even if their claims are not paid in full.
This certainty may mark a shift in bargaining power from creditors to debtors.
However, it is unlikely that any major shift will take place, given the stringent
nature of the requirements for access to the new value exception."'
Another noteworthy aspect of the decision is its emphasis on the stringent
requirements of the new value exception. This makes sense in that the court

however, express doubts as to whether confirmation would occur. Eventually, the
court concluded that the bankruptcy court initially must make the determination of the
possible confirmability of Bonner's plan. Id.
127. For instance, one commentator has asserted that the reasoning in BonnerI
is flawed when applied to single asset reorganizations. Michael H. Strub, Jr., New
Value Rule: Applying the Single-Asset Paradigm: Competition, Bargaining, and
Exclusivity Under the New Value Rule: Applying the Single-AssetParadigmof Bonner
Mall, 11 BANKING L.J. 228 (1994). Although BonnerI is a case involving a single
asset, the court did not have occasion to apply its reasoning to the facts of the case.
The commentator suggests that had the court done so, it would have realized that its
reasoning is unworkable in such situations because the new value exception imposes
requirements whichare inconsistentwiththe objectives of a single-assetreorganization.

Id. It may be possible to use such an argument in future cases where a single asset
is involved.
128. As noted above, few plans based on the newvalue exception are successfuilly
confirmed. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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seemed to view the high standards as a precautionary measure against abuse
of the exception. The court seemed to recognize the potential for debtors to
use the exception in an inappropriate manner. It responded to this by
suggesting29 in dicta that the already strict requirements remain so, if not tighten
1
up a bit.
This potential tightening of the initial requirements for availability of the
new value exception to a debtor may have several effects. First, if courts do
indeed apply an even higher standard, hopefully the intended effect of less
abuse of the exception will result. In theory, by increasing the threshold
standards, more debtors with potential to abuse the process will be denied a
new value exception induced confirmation. Of course, this is exactly what the
court in Bonner I is trying to accomplish. 3
Second, if a higher standard is applied and results in a more efficient and
abuse-free reorganization process, other courts may begin to take notice. This
could influence courts which were once reluctant to recognize the exception's
viability to reconsider the value of the exception. If, by allowing the
exception in a narrower form, reorganizations become more likely to succeed
and enjoy increased estate values, the policy arguments presented in Bonner
I will only become stronger. Consequently, recognition of the exception may
become much more attractive to many courts.
However, stricter application of the requirements of the new value
exception may have potentially negative effects. Where recognized, the new
value exception is already difficult to take advantage of due to its tough
prerequisites. If courts begin to further restrict access to the exception by
tightening its requirements and go too far, the exception may become
functionally useless. If it becomes too difficult to meet the requirements of
the exception, there may be little difference between a jurisdiction which
recognizes the exception and one which does not. As a result, any potential
benefits which may be gained from the exception would be lost.
Whatever its future impact on the reorganization process in the Ninth
Circuit, Bonner I is an important case because it is the first case in some time
to address and answer the issue of the new value exception's continuing
viability. Those with an interest in the issue now have some idea of how
courts may treat the new value question. Further, the decision represents the
highest court opinion directly answering the question since the Bankruptcy

129. Bonnerl,2 F.3 d at 918 ("[W]e conclude that the new value 'exception,' with
its stringent requirements, survives. We recognize that, if applied carelessly, the
doctrine has the potential to subvert the interests of creditors and allow debtors and old
equity to abuse the reorganization process. The proper answer to these concerns is
vigilance on the part of bankruptcy courts in ensuring that all of the requirements of
the new value exception are met in every case.").

130. Id.
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Code's enactment in 1978.1" Because of its potential to swing the
pendulum in other jurisdictions, some of the possible effects discussed above
also may begin to occur in circuits other than the ninth.
Prior to the Bonner I decision, there was a major split in the Ninth
Circuit over the new value exception issue."' Obviously, Bonner I will
serve to quiet this debate and unify the circuit. However, one major question
remains: what effect will BonnerI have on the other circuits?
The answer to this question is unclear at this point in time. As discussed
previously, the courts of appeals in the other circuits have remained largely
Although Bonner I is a thorough and well-reasoned
silent on this issue.'
decision, other courts may continue to follow the Supreme Court's lead in
As previously
avoiding the issue by deciding cases on other grounds.'
noted, the exception's requirements are difficult to meet, so in many cases it
is easier for a court to simply assume the continued existence of the exception
and find that its requirements are not met, rather than decide the difficult issue
of whether the exception survives. Several commentators have speculated that
this issue will most likely remain unresolved until Congress directly addresses
it.'35 However, even if this speculation proves true, Bonner I is still
important because it identifies the issues of the debate and sets forth numerous
policy justifications for keeping the new value exception.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Ninth Circuit is unified with respect to the new value
exception, the debate still continues in courts throughout the rest of the
country. Only time will tell whether Bonner I will push these courts towards
a resolution of the issue. Perhaps Congress will eventually be called on to
resolve the issue through the legislative process. But for now, Bonner I
should prove to be an important decision which has the possibility of shaping
the new value debate and providing insight into the issues surrounding the
question of the continuing viability of the new value exception.
DOUGLAS S. NEVILLE

131. J. Ronald Trost et al., Supplement to Survey of the New Value Exception to
the Absolute PriorityRule,C836 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 273, 280 (1993).
132. Aronzon et al., supra note 32, at 417.
133. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Rusoh, supra note 3 at 1314-15; Aronzon et al. supra note 32 at
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